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Article 8

Donaldson faces these challenges in a calm, careful, and charitable manner. He rightly discerns that the
key issue is hermeneutical—exactly how is the Bible to
be interpreted? He addresses this question in his initial
chapter (1-30), which explores the false and inconsistent literalism on which so much dispensationalism is
based. Only when the first order interpretative questions are addressed is it then possible to proceed to answer the question “Who is Israel?” (31-69). He effectively exposes the dispensational dual-track “Israel on
Earth, Christians in Heaven” approach. This approach
clears the ground for a much-needed clarification of
the nature of “the kingdom of God,” which rejects
the restoration of some sort of territorially delimited
Davidic realm (70-95).
Thereafter, Donaldson proceeds to correct dispensationalist misreading of passages such as Daniel
9:24-7, Matthew 24, I Thessalonians 4:13-18, II
Thessalonians 2:1-10, and Revelation 20:1-10 (96147). The discussion of these passages offered by
Donaldson is rich with insight and worthy of careful
study, especially by those who have allowed the dispensational system and outlook to become part of
their mental furniture. Donaldson clearly draws from
writers familiar to many readers of Pro Rege, such as
William Hendriksen (1900-82), Herman Ridderbos
(1909-2007), and David Holwerda, late of Calvin
Seminary. Also, and especially in his conclusions (150160), Donaldson’s thinking has been influenced by

N.T. Wright, currently Research Professor of New
Testament and Early Christianity, at St. Mary’s College
in the University of Saint Andrews, Scotland. He exhibits a deep accord with Wright’s contextual readings
of Scripture and integral approach to eschatology (557, 68, 80-1, 154, 159). Donaldson acknowledges that
he has drawn on the work of J. Richard Middleton,
Professor of Biblical Worldview and Exegesis at
Northeastern Seminary, Rochester, NY, as did N.T.
Wright (152-4, 159).
Those seeking a lucid and accessible introduction
to the many problems inherent to premillennial dispensationalism should make Donaldson’s book their
first choice. It is strongly recommended. Of course,
there is more to be said—as is always the case. A passing
reference is made to the fact that what has passed for a
Christian worldview “has been influenced by Platonic
dualism and by ideas reminiscent of Gnosticism”
(154). Arguably, this observation, if followed through,
would serve to recast our understanding of the entire
history of post-Apostolic Christianity and, not least,
provide considerable insight into the philosophical
roots and historical origins of more than dispensationalism itself. Certainly, an appreciation of the teachings
and influence of premillennial dispensationalism helps
to explain why so many avowedly “Bible-believing”
evangelical Christians remain tragically impervious to
more biblically grounded and directed calls for integral
Christian thinking and living.

Smith, James K. A. Imagining the Kingdom: How Worship Works. Volume 2 of Cultural Liturgies. Grand
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2013. 198 pages. ISBN 978-0-8010-3578-4. Reviewed by Laurence C. Sibley,
Jr., visiting professor at Baltic Reformed Theological Seminary, Riga, Latvia.
Imagining the Kingdom: How Worship Works begins
in a Costco food court as author James K.A. Smith
reads Wendell Berry’s Bringing it to the Table, an anthology of essays critiquing the dominant systems of
food production and consumption. While reading,
Smith realizes that there is a gap between his worldview and his actions; he ponders that “‘the food court
at Costco’ might be a kind of shorthand for Berry’s picture of the sixth circle of hell”(Imagining 8). Asserting
that Imagining the Kingdom “is something of a hybrid,
pitched between the academy and the church, since
its argument is aimed at both” (Imagining xvii), Smith
uncovers the roots of a Costco lifestyle and contrasts
those roots with those of the kingdom of God. In other words, he presents two visions of the good life that
are each struggling for dominance.

Imagining the Kingdom is the second volume of a
3-volume series on the theology of culture that Smith
calls the Cultural Liturgies Project. In a superb manner, Smith packs a lot into a book that is less than 200
pages. Seeking the renewal of liturgical and cultural
practice leads Smith to write for educators, pastors,
and worship leaders who are reflective and open to
new ways of envisioning liturgical practice. He invites
scholars to explore phenomenology and philosophy of
religion, offering some original, constructive proposals
for a research agenda. Throughout the book he uses
sidebars from fiction, art, and life stories, as well as
philosophical, cultural, and liturgical passages.
Professor of philosophy at Calvin College, where
he holds the Gary & Henrietta Byker Chair in Applied
Reformed Theology & Worldview, Smith is also the
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editor of The Church and Postmodern Culture series
(Baker Academic: http://www.churchandpomo.org).
In Volume 1 of his Cultural Liturgies Project, Desiring
the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and Cultural
Formation (Baker Academic, 2009), Smith proposed
a theology of culture that understands human beings as embodied actors rather than merely thinking
things; prioritizes practices rather than ideas as the
site of challenge and resistance; looks at cultural
practices through the lens of worship or liturgy.
(Desiring 35)
According to Smith, humans show their intention
through their loves and desires. This intention is shaped
by “bodily practices, routines, or rituals” (Desiring 63)
that capture our hearts and form an imaginary view
of the world. In a return to Augustine and pre-modernity, Smith asserts that the human person is homo
liturgicus—not homo rationalis, as in Descartes and
modernity (Desiring 40).
Kinaesthetics and Poetics
The Augustinian view of humanity as homo liturgicus
resurfaces in Imagining the Kingdom, as Smith digs
deeper into a theory of practice. Smith draws on the
work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) on
kinaesthetics—how the body knows or perceives—
and Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002) on poetics—how
the body hears stories—to build a theoretical toolbox
for naming and articulating a Christian liturgical anthropology (Imagining 29, 101). Smith believes that
kinaesthetics and poetics are at the heart of liturgical anthropology. His working axiom is “rooted in a
theological claim about the sorts of creatures we are:
created in the image of God, and called to image the
Son who is the image of the invisible God, we, too,
are incarnate in a sense. We are sacramental animals”
(Imagining 101).
Smith devotes much of chapters 1 and 2 to expounding the insights of Merleau-Ponty (kinaesthetics) and Bourdieu (poetics) so that we can “appreciate
the dynamics of habituation that make us the sorts of
actors we are” (Imagining 33). In so doing, he pushes
back against an intellectualist account of actions that
assumes that as we think, we do. Rather, he asserts that
as we do (habits), we think (theology, worldview, theoretical ethics); for Smith believes that “our incarnating,
accommodating God meets us in and through the creaturely conditions” (Imagining 33).
To develop his idea, Smith writes, “MerleauPonty’s Phenomenology of Perceptions1 (PP hereafter) is
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a classic account of how the body ‘knows’” (Imagining
41). This “knowing” involves a hybridity, or an incarnational mind and body experience, which is neither intellectualist nor mere biological response. We
develop a habitual way of being-in-the-world that is
carried in our bodies but is known on a level that precedes and eludes conscious reflection/thinking, below
the radar of the mind: “The body carries a kind of
acquired, habituated knowledge or know-how that is
irreducible yet fundamentally orienting for our beingin-the-world” (Imagining 45). According to this view,
our bodies are not just instruments of perception but
are who we are: incarnated persons. Similarly, the body
is the “me” that dwells in the world, my constant background. Smith asks, “What if the Christian life. . .is inscribed in our ‘habit-body’. . .[,] a sort of ‘momentum
which throws us into our tasks, our cares, our situation, our familiar horizons?’” (PP 94; Smith 45)
In other words, experience is constituted against
an acquired background that primes us to configure impressions into a world. For instance, we move
through familiar places without thinking/antepredicatively (PP 149—prior to and without predication)
because our bodies have learned and inhabit this space.
Smith asks, “what if inhabiting the world as God’s creation requires a similar ‘antepredicative’ knowledge of
place?” (Imagining 53) Just knowing/intellecting the
doctrine of creation is insufficient; inhabitation of the
world as creation requires rehabituation “in the embodied practices of Christian worship” (Imagining 53).
He asks, “How do we teach the body[?]. . . .How is
the body trained to perceive the world?” (Imagining 73)
Smith’s answer, drawn from Bourdieu’s concept
of habitus—a system of dispositions (lasting, acquired
schemes of perception, thought, and action), an embodied know-how that is carried in a community of
practice—is that the body is trained in social liturgical situations, either Christian or secular.2 Habitus is
a kind of embodied tradition, a handed-down way
of being. Complex, ethically charged behavioral patterns that were once learned in community function
like “a motor running under the hood” (Imagining
82) while we shop or run errands. It is this autonomic
habitus that is often missed by intellectualist models
of behavior that assert that we primarily act according to conscious principles. When the liturgy of the
mall leads to a habitus of consumerism, principles of
simple living often lose the battle: Costco in spite of
Wendell Berry. Does all this mean that the mind has
no significant role to play? Early in the Imagining the

Kingdom, Smith situates the intellect, the life of the
mind, and worldviews as important, but he also views
them as secondary to the imagination as the source of
action. The imagination needs the critique and guidance of the mind. However, knowing what to love is
not purely propositional knowledge; it is an aesthetic
know-how that is derived from stories, pictures, images, and metaphors (Imagining 10–16, and later
113–114, 125–126). Therefore, it is a “hybridity” or
an incarnational mind and body experience, neither
intellectualist nor mere biological response.
Escaping the food court at Costco
Having explained the basis of liturgical and cultural
practice as a “hybridity,” Smith turns, in chapters 3
and 4, to exploring how worship works, using the
Ponty-Bourdieu toolbox. He focuses on the centrality
of the imagination and the importance of the arts in
sanctifying perceptions, especially the art of the story:
“We’re less convinced by arguments than moved by
stories” (Imagining 108). In words and signs, Christian
worship enacts and performs the story of God’s redeeming work and his kingdom, drawing us into his
action. This story is understood by the imagination.
Alternately, the stories of secular liturgies—of, say,
the mall or of an electronic device—imagine another
kingdom, one that is centered on the self rather than
on God. For instance, Smith explains that the iPhone
engages our bodies in shaping our imagination and our
behavior. The rituals of handling and mastering the
iPhone habituate us to treat the world as available to
me to be selected, scaled, scanned, and enjoyed; what
surrounds me exists for me (Imagining 143). Similarly,
signing up for Twitter or Facebook leads to habits that
shape one’s orientation to the world and, indeed, make
one’s world. Because they shape our consciousness and
world, secular liturgies are actually religious, imagining gods and visions of the good life.
By contrast, according to Smith, “Christian worship is an intentionally decentering practice, calling us
out of ourselves into the very life of God” (Imagining
140). This decentering and re-formation through
Christian worship culminates in sending the worshipers out to embody a foretaste of God’s shalom. Invited
into union with the Triune God, we are formed for
service. Smith points to John Calvin, who saw worship
as a formative practice leading to the renewal not only
of worshipers but also of the city beyond the church
door.
In Christian worship, not only the decentering

and re-formational effects of worship but also the form
of worship—the form of the story telling—matters,
Smith asserts. He explains that, because the form of
worship enacts the Story, we can’t distill the message of
the gospel and then place it in a coffee shop container
or just any form of meeting. Rather, as liturgical animals, we are formed by the practices of worship, either
the iPhone or the Christian liturgy. Smith includes a
comparative chart of historic liturgies demonstrating
the common shape of the liturgy over the centuries,
now found in five different 20th-century books of worship, and urges their use. Worship works as it is repeated, forming and shaping perception and habitus,
habituating us to walk humbly and justly with our
God in his world.
In a sense, Imagining the Kingdom is an exercise
in liturgical catechesis. It is an extended reflection on
practice, an intellectual analysis of how worship works.
Far from dismissing the guidance of the mind and of
theological principle, Smith seeks to direct our reflection towards our embodied, incarnate being-in-theworld so that we can choose how to be habituated,
how to escape the food court at Costco.
Liturgical theologians commonly assert the formative effects of liturgy in terms of the ideas and the
truths presented in the Eucharist and baptism, but
they seldom explain how this works, as Smith does.
Some look mainly at religious rituals in general; they
use the insights of Victor Taylor, Catharine Bell, and
Roy Rappaport and make comparisons with Christian
rituals, theorizing about the formative effects. Martha
Moore Keish in her book Do This in Remembrance of
Me3 draws on Rappaport to emphasize the bodily nature of ritual: “The physical doing is critically important in the celebration of the eucharist” (Do This 92).
Louis Marie Chauvet (Symbol and Sacrament) cites
Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu mostly in terms of language theory, along with J. L. (John Langshaw, 1911–
1960) Austin’s theory of speech acts, to show how language functions in the liturgy. Joyce Ann Zimmerman
and Graham Hughes draw on Paul Ricour’s hermeneutical approach to interpret liturgical texts. But seldom do we find an in-depth use of Merleau-Ponty and
Bourdieu’s phenomenology and sociology. Smith has
done us a great service in linking Merleau-Ponty’s and
Bourdieu’s studies with the Christian liturgical formation of character and behavior, focusing on how the
body is trained to perceive, and how sustained group
experience trains the body’s imagination and desires.
Imagining is characterized by a rich interaction
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with other scholars from many disciplines, which leads
to fruitful footnotes for the reader. The conversation is
going on at two levels, and the bottom of the page is
as much fun as the top. However, because of the many
valuable sources in the footnotes, I was disappointed
to find no bibliography at the end of the book. The
indices are also skimpy, running only 2 ½ pages for
names and 1 ½ for subjects. I found this especially
frustrating for a book partly aimed at scholars.
With that said, Imagining the Kingdom: How
Worship Works is a ground-breaking effort. I will refer to it again and again in pursuing my own research

agenda, seeking to better understand how worship
works.
Endnotes
1. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of
Perception, trans, Colin Smith (New York: Taylor
and Francis e-Library, 2005).
2. In explaining habitus, Smith draws mostly on
Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans.
Richard Nice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1990).
3. Martha Moore Keish, Do This in Remembrance of
Me (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008)

Wittenberg, David. Time Travel: The Popular Philosophy of Narrative. New York: Fordham University Press,
2013. 306 pages. ISBN: 9780823249961. Reviewed by Josh Matthews, professor of English, Dordt College.
You might’ve seen this one before: it’s a familiar
science fiction (SF) plot. Frustrated by his inability
to defeat the Superhero, the Archvillain builds a time
machine to travel to the past, intending to kill the
Superhero as a child. Someone therefore needs to save
this child; otherwise, the Archvillain will take over the
world. Because of this threat to the past from the future, the plot, as it were, thickens.
“But wait,” you wonder. “If the Archvillain really
did kill the child-Superhero, then why would he need
to travel to the past? Wouldn’t the Superhero already
be dead in the present? In fact, the Superhero never
would have existed in the first place, meaning that the
Archvillain wouldn’t ever need to travel to the past after he time-traveled! He built the time machine, but if
he kills the Superhero, he never actually built it!”
Such time-travel paradoxes have long been fodder for SF stories, but few have considered them to
be more than silly puzzles or fun little thought-experiments for analytical philosophy. David Wittenberg’s
book Time Travel: The Popular Philosophy of Narrative,
however, challenges us to consider why so many SF
narratives feature time-travel paradoxes like this as crucial plot elements. For Wittenberg, Associate Professor
of English at the University of Iowa, time-travel stories
fundamentally challenge our understanding of narrative. These stories ask, as he puts it, “many of the most
basic questions about storytelling, […] about the philosophy of temporality, history, and subjectivity” (2).
In other words, time-travel fiction literally depicts key
questions about the construction of history and the
phenomenology of reading and interpreting. This is a
serious kind of fiction in which readers and viewers
become, perhaps unwittingly, “narrative theorists” (8).
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Wittenberg spends much of the book arguing and
demonstrating, via close readings of SF texts such as
episodes of Star Trek and the first Back to the Future
movie, that time-travel challenges our assumptions
about narrative. As he points out, literary theorists
have long distinguished between “story” and “plot,”
or, in Wittenberg’ preferred terms (coined by Russian
formalists), between “fabula” and “sjuzhet.” The fabula
is the chronological order of a narrative’s events, while
the sjuzhet is the order of events as presented by a narrative. Thus, for Back to the Future (1985), the fabula
begins in 1955 and ends in 1985: first, Marty McFly
in 1955 tries desperately to get his parents to meet and
fall in love, and then in 1985 McFly time-travels in a
DeLorean into the past. But the sjuzhet of Back to the
Future depicts McFly as beginning his story in 1985,
travelling to 1955, and then back to 1985.1 Wittenberg
demonstrates that narratologists and many writers,
such as Henry James, have long preferred fabula to
sjuzhet. In James’ view, for example, writers should
be a kind of “historian,” thinking first of fabula and
then constructing the sjuzhet (120). Moreover, when
we think about the events in a story, we tend to re-tell
them chronologically, even if the narrative does not
present them chronologically. Wittenberg calls this
common preference for fabula “fabular apriority.”
Time-travel stories, as in this example of Back to
the Future, challenge fabular apriority. They depict,
literally, via time-travelers within their plots, a crisis
of narrative priority. What if, as in a reader/viewer’s
experience of narrative, the sjuzhet is really prior to the
fabula? By trying to change his past, the Archvillain
who intends to kill the child-Superhero challenges
traditional narrative theory. His story posits that the

